Strategic Materials: May 30, 2023

Securing the Strategic Materials Supply Chain

In the case of military aggression by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) against Taiwan, economic shockwaves would ripple across the Pacific. How can the U.S. prepare America’s defense industrial base for this contingency? The answer begins with ensuring access to strategic materials – the essential elements that form the foundation of the modern economy. Since the end of the Cold War, the PRC has cornered the market on a wide range of minerals and downstream processing that converts ore into modern life’s building block materials. More troubling, the PRC has also demonstrated a willingness to flex its power by temporarily cutting off exports of strategic materials to America’s partners and allies, as it did with rare earth elements in 2010 and threatened to do in 2017.

Transportation (formerly Global Agility): May 30, 2023

Sustaining Global Power Through U.S. Transportation Infrastructure: Setting the Conditions for Optimal Multimodal Logistics

The United States’ dependence on uncoordinated public and private investment across the transportation and logistics ecosystem (trucking, railroad, air freight, port and harbor, inland waterway, deep-sea shipping, and warehousing industry) puts the nation’s ability to mobilize for major military action at risk. Despite various laws and government programs designed to protect the U.S. industry, recent wide-ranging supply chain chaos exposed systemic vulnerabilities which impinge on industrial, consumer, and national security interests. As economic activity normalizes in the wake of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic, there is no expectation that the various corporate and government entities will construct a robust, long-lasting, system-wide framework to repair these exposures.

Weapons: May 30, 2023

The Need for Speed: The Case for Continued Development of Hypersonic and Directed Energy Weapons

As the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and to a lesser extent Russia, rapidly develop and field hypersonic and directed energy weapons, the United States (US) faces a strategic military capabilities gap. The PRC’s arsenal of hypersonic weapons extends its anti-access area denial capabilities throughout the South China Sea, increasing the required standoff distances for US military forces to operate in a conflict safely. To prevent the PRC from reshaping the liberal world order, the US should continue to develop offensive and defensive hypersonic and directed energy weapons to complement its current arsenal while addressing defense industrial base issues, including infrastructure, supply chain, and human capital, and fostering cooperation with allies and partners.

Advanced Manufacturing: May 30, 2023

Advanced Manufacturing: A Possible Asymmetric Advantage to Ensure Security, Prosperity, and Values

Despite growing tension over threats to the current world order, the U.S. and like-minded partners maintain the power, tools, and competitive advantage to continue leading the pursuit of economic prosperity, preservation of peace, and defense of sovereignty for all nations. Advanced manufacturing is one such tool that, if developed and employed appropriately, offers the opportunity to further the concept of global prosperity and thwart revisionist ambitions. Analyzing advanced manufacturing is complicated because it is not an industry but a system of technological processes and products that are rapidly evolving. Reinforcing domestic manufacturing by progressing and integrating advanced technologies can help restore U.S. manufacturing capacity, maintain its leadership on the world stage, and usher in the next era of economic prosperity.

C4ISR: May 30, 2023

A View of the C4ISR Industry in the Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) Environment

The 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) illuminates China’s economic rise and newfound global influence, underpinning the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ambitions of challenging the free and open international rules-based system. After decades of studying the United States, the CCP has undergone a sustained effort to bolster its military to disrupt the U.S. ability to project power. Simultaneously, the CCP is pursuing a concept called “informatized” war to replicate the U.S. approach to network warfare. Both nations rely on their defense industries to outpace their adversaries in this pivotal aspect of great power competition.

Cyber (formerly Information and Communications Technology): May 30, 2023

Safeguarding Cyberspace: The Imperative for Reform and Rebalance

The United States (US) will most likely continue to suffer unacceptable losses in strategic competition with autocracies in cyberspace until it shapes the cyberspace domain by improving cyberspace attention, leadership, and governance, fostering a more collaborative relationship with private industry to advance digital literacy and cybersecurity, and involving more offensive cyberspace operations through integrated deterrence via defend forward and persistent engagement strategies. Allies and partners should be engaged to ensure synchronous policies. The 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS), though appropriately advancing cybersecurity, will unlikely bend the positive slope of Intellectual Property (IP) theft, ransomware loss, malign cyber information operations (CIO), and ongoing cyberspace threats to US critical infrastructure by Russia and China. The US remains largely timid in cyberspace, especially in punishing malign actors, fearing escalation to kinetic conflict, and limits itself to cybersecurity. To date, US operations involving denial capabilities have not resulted in escalation to military conflict.

Energy: May 30, 2023

Maximizing the First 5% of GDP: An Optimistic Assessment of the United States Energy Sector and Policy Recommendations for the Future

Currently, there is considerable pessimism in the United States. Inflation, political polarization, debt brinksmanship, and protracted conflict dominate headlines. However, the mood is noticeably different in the energy sector. Energy is one of America’s greatest strengths, and after decades of languish and underinvestment (in certain parts of the industry), the sector may now be positioned to lead a new era of American leadership and growth. For the first time in decades, there is significant investment from the federal government, and the private sector and academia are eager to accept the challenges the administration has articulated.

Land Combat Systems (formerly Land Domain): May 30, 2023

Land Domain Platforms

Opportunities exists to boost innovation in the Land Domain Platforms (LDP) industry, which consists of markets for combat tracked maneuver/fires vehicles, wheeled sustainment vehicles, and medium/heavy vehicles. The end of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq brought about a downturn in the industry as occurred during the post-Cold War era. However, due to a combination of factors that include rapid technological change, the U.S. strategic competition with China, and the Russo-Ukrainian War, the domestic and international context are in alignment to enact policies that will have long-term, positive effects on the LDP industry. Congress and DoD must work together to set conditions that foster innovation across the LDP industry to improve the production of systems necessary to dominate land domain threats out to 2040 and beyond.

Networking (Formerly Newsmedia) May 30, 2023

Safeguarding Cyberspace: The Imperative for Reform & Rebalance

The United States (US) will most likely continue to suffer unacceptable losses in strategic competition with autocracies in cyberspace until it shapes the cyberspace domain by improving cyberspace attention, leadership, and governance, fostering a more collaborative relationship with private industry to advance digital literacy and cybersecurity, and involving more offensive cyberspace operations through integrated deterrence via defend forward and persistent engagement strategies. Allies and partners should be engaged to ensure synchronous policies. The 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS), though appropriately advancing cybersecurity, will unlikely bend the positive slope of Intellectual Property (IP) theft, ransomware loss, malign cyber information operations (CIO), and ongoing cyberspace threats to US critical infrastructure by Russia and China. The US remains largely timid in cyberspace, especially in punishing malign actors, fearing escalation to kinetic conflict, and limits itself to cybersecurity. To date, US operations involving denial capabilities have not resulted in escalation to military conflict. To shape the cyberspace domain to protect US and allied interests and protect US political and economic sovereignty, the United States must: 1. Shape the cyberspace domain and out-compete its adversaries, who view their relationships with the US as zero sum. 2. Afford the National Cyber Director (NCD) the authorities to synchronize and integrate US efforts to shape the cyberspace domain, including combating foreign information operations (IO). 3. Invest in emerging technology and public-private partnerships to out-compete adversaries in the cyberspace domain, including expanding cyber resilience, advancing private sector cooperation through a broader cyber incident reporting base, establishing a non-DoD cyberspace Reserve Force, establishing a Federal “Hack Us” program through the Office of the NCD (ONCD) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and enacting bipartisan legislation to protect Americans from malign, foreign cyber information activities. 4. Provide certain Federal government agencies with pre-approved authorities to engage cyberspace threats with proportional, defensive cyberspace operations to deter, disrupt, and destroy malicious cyberspace activity at its source.