Ground Combat Systems (Formerly Land Combat Systems, Land Domain) –
The COVID-19 global health crisis highlighted just how complex the world has become. In this century, people have benefited from the invention of life-altering technologies while seeing those same technologies create unprecedented global interconnectedness. In his book, The Revenge of Geography, Robert Kaplan provides an effective analogy to understand this dynamic:
The smaller the world becomes because of technology, the more that every place in it becomes important—becomes strategic, in many cases. Think of a wristwatch: so small, but once you start to take the watch apart it suddenly becomes vast and complicated. That is the world of the twenty-first century.
When compared with the concept of world order, Kaplan’s analogy of delicate and complicated wristwatches (with vast inner workings) illustrates the multilayered complexity of today’s global environment. Like the ripples in a pond created by a pebble, a single change in the status quo can have unprecedented second and third order effects – ripples in the world order.
Policymakers and strategic planners describe exogenous events or factors as unpredictable and unexpected scenarios, external to the long-term plans of any one country – they are often events (large or small) that derail individual strategies, and create a divergence in the existing world order. For example, many thought the Cold War would end in conflict, but several exogenous factors caused the Soviet Union to collapse unexpectedly, ending the stalemate. Whether it was the nuclear reactor leak at Chernobyl in 1986 which fueled a lack of confidence in President Gorbachev or the significant drop in oil prices that crushed the Russian economy, these scenarios revealed a new world order where United States (U.S.) and European powers were in the driver’s seat.
Today, that world order is being challenged in new ways. China’s economic growth, military spending, and expanding influence, are increasing U.S. and allied concerns associated with China’s political practices, and are creating what Graham Alison called “structural stress” in the global order.5 President Xi Jinping has said that China will be the leading world power by 2049. U.S. national security strategy maintains that rivals, like China, are undermining American interests. The U.S. remains committed to a balance of power that favors America, its allies, and partners. As the two strongest economies in the world, the U.S. and China remain interdependent, where each profits from one another’s economic positions. In the context of this dynamic, and considering key lessons learned from COVID-19, what can the U.S. do to ensure its national security strategy can stand up against future exogenous events? This paper evaluates the U.S. response to COVID-19 and calls attention to U.S. economic policy deficiencies, highlights inadequacies in U.S. strategic communications, and reveals weaknesses in U.S. supply chains and their land domain equities. Keeping in mind the potential for future exogenous events (and their ripple effects), this paper recommends ways in which the U.S. can leverage economic tools to maintain advantages vis-à-vis China, establish a clear strategic communications strategy, and bolster supply chain agility and resiliency.
Successful prosecution of whole of government operations across time and space to achieve political outcomes relies on multiple domains. Control of resources, territory and populations is often decided within the land domain. In this context, this paper examines the interplay of economic policy, strategic communications, and the U.S. ability to mobilize in response to exogenous events, such as COVID-19.
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