News | Aug. 21, 2018

Plotting a Course Through Dangerous Waters: An Analysis of the Shipbuilding Industrial Base, Policies, Risks, and Opportunities

As the United States settles into the 21st century, the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s one road, one belt effort mark the public reemergence of great power competition and refocus America’s strategic priorities. The ability of the US to project power, maintain freedom of navigation in the commons and deter aggression has never been more critical. “The revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups—are actively competing against the United States and our allies and partners.” As America’s strategic rivals actively attempt to undermine her instruments of power, a strong industrial base acts as a countervailing force to their efforts. The ability to field, man and maintain an effective seagoing force is fundamental to protecting the homeland, promoting American prosperity here and abroad, preserving peace through strength, and advancing American influence.

After years of sequestration and military drawdowns, the US has committed to rebuilding its military might, including its defense industrial base, in order to deter future armed conflict. A reorientation away from counter-insurgency, and primarily land-air operations, with a refocus on full-spectrum, near-peer conflict has also driven this renewed prioritization. However, the US must also plan support for any possible conflict, and not rely exclusively on deterrence. Naval forces will likely play a major role in all phases of a future conflict, especially in the Western Pacific, and may hold the key to preventing a war in the first place. Planning and prior investment in the shipbuilding industrial base are keys to fielding adequate capabilities to command the sea in the event of a near peer or multi-front conventional conflict. Should a conflict arise, significant wartime government spending would buoy the shipbuilding and repair industry as the US attempts to meet the logistical demands of a high-end fight at sea.

The US Navy and the defense maritime industry aim to enable the US to “conduct prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea,” including the supply chain and industrial production that enable it to execute a full-scale, multi-front operation. Further, it empowers the US to “protect America from attack and preserve America’s strategic influence” as well as “deter aggression and enable peaceful resolution of crises on terms acceptable to the United States and its allies and partners.” Should deterrence fail, the US Navy must have the ways necessary to “defeat any enemy.”

Given that, is the current shipbuilding industrial base capable of surging towards a 355-ship Navy, a corresponding increase in merchant and lift ships, and repairing and/or replacing combat losses? The answer, in our estimation, is that it can do so, but not rapidly or efficiently. That is more a function of political will and government investment than the industry’s ability to innovate, produce, and deliver. The “market” (shipbuilders) would not invest in something the "customer” (United States Navy) does not want.

The current shipbuilding industrial base is sound and poised for modest growth, having maintained some stability over the previous five years as lengthy production timelines for US Navy and Coast Guard ships kept yards occupied. Future expansion will be spurred by increases in defense spending, a growing economy and recovering oil prices, and analysts predict 4.6% annual revenue growth over the next five years. Should the Congress elect to aggressively pursue the Navy’s wartime inventory objective of a 355-ship fleet, the industrial base and maritime workforce are able to expand significantly over the course of several years. Recruiting, training, and retaining skilled workers would set the pace for any expansion of the industrial base.

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