Nuclear Triad –
2024 Antonelli Award Winner: Great Power Competition (GPC) with two nuclear peers/near-peers is driving the United States to confront the realities of an aging nuclear weapons stockpile and production infrastructure, shrinking manufacturing base, and a nuclear enterprise strategy that has been focused for a generation on maintenance and caretaking rather than investment and recapitalization. China’s rapid ascent to near-peer nuclear power status, Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling in its war against Ukraine, and the emergence of North Korea as a nuclear threat in the Pacific that could conceivably strike the U.S. have all focused U.S. national security leaders across current and recent administrations on the critical importance of the U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE). While focus and rhetoric are important, overcoming the significant challenges to reinvigorating the U.S. NSE will require fortitude, a whole of government approach, and enduring political will.
The United States has now begun a long overdue, decades-long program to modernize both the nuclear triad and the NSE. The U.S. nuclear triad consists of fielded weapons systems across three legs: Land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) make up the ground leg, submarine-launched ICBMs aboard nuclear-powered submarines make up the sea leg, and heavy bombers armed with bombs and cruise missiles make up the air leg. Distinct from the triad but no less important, the NSE encompasses the warhead design capacity, weapons production, and the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) supporting these platforms. After decades of post-Cold War neglect, modernization of the triad and NSE are both vital to maintaining the long-term credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Deferred modernization has mortgaged margin and over-leveraged the flexibility of operational systems. Neglect, global supply chain disruptions, and a weakened U.S. industrial base have exposed vulnerabilities in the NSE.
The initial plan for triad modernization, first embarked on late in the Obama administration, is now widely understood to be insufficient in the current global security environment. The NSE is struggling to support the new demands placed on it, and its infrastructure modernization plans are inadequate to support an uncertain future. Great Power Competition demands not only that the United States field weapons systems that address today’s threats and ensure deterrence, but also that it invest in and sustain an enduringly robust NSE. Rather than simply manage a stockpile, this NSE must have the capability to produce all the nuclear material, designs, and critical components required to ensure that the U.S. nuclear deterrent can scale, evolve, and react to a dynamic and volatile world. The capability of the U.S. nuclear enterprise is itself a critical component of a credible deterrent, and should be prioritized as such. Being a nuclear superpower brings many responsibilities, and maintaining the NSE is one of them.
SUMMARY OF CHALLENGES
Whole of Government Recommendations
Apply Appropriate Perspective & Avoid Zero-Sum Thinking – U.S. political and military leaders must constantly contextualize U.S. nuclear deterrence and advocate for all the resources required to keep that cornerstone of U.S. national security strategy on firm foundation.
Centralize Coordination and Accountability – The President should appoint an advisor at the Deputy National Security Advisor or Deputy Assistant to the President level on the National Security Council to coordinate and oversee a whole-of-government approach to the modernization of the triad and the NSE.
Streamline Acquisition of Strategic Systems – Congress and the executive branch should coordinate to develop and expand the use of unique acquisition authorities like the National Sea-based Deterrence Fund for strategic systems in order to promote flexibility and enhance industrial capacity and supply chain stability within the nuclear industrial base and the NSE.
Strengthen Supply Chains – The U.S. must deploy a whole-of-government approach to strengthen the reliability and resilience of the supply chains on which both the NSE and the nuclear triad rely.
Recommendations for Near-Term Modifications to Nuclear Posture
Expand Recapitalization of B-52 – The U.S. should expand its recapitalization of B-52 delivery systems beyond the planned 46 bombers.
Plan to MIRV Minuteman III – The U.S. should develop plans to increase the number of warheads fielded on the current Minuteman force to hedge against Sentinel transition risk and the likely event that Russia abandons New START.
Deploy dual-capable aircraft and weapons to the Indo-Pacific – The U.S. should coordinate with partners and allies in the region to forward deploy dual-capable aircraft and associated nuclear weapons and bolster the credibility of extended deterrence with minimal additional stress to the NSE.
Recommendations for Investments Beyond the POR
Develop Capabilities to Address Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBT) – The United States must develop the capability to hold at risk the command-and-control elements, weapons, and other adversary capabilities that are either deeply buried or oriented in ways that make reaching them difficult.
Invest in Defense and Survivability – Hardening critical nodes provides a hedge against the emerging threat posed to U.S. nuclear systems by hypersonic weapons and other emerging technologies. Additionally, investing in strategic defense in the late 2020’s and early 2030’s can provide flexibility to bridge deterrence gaps that may be created by triad modernization programmatic delays.
Acquire and Field Tomahawk-Based SLCM-N – The U.S. must hedge against the survivability risks to the sea leg of the triad posed by quantum sensing. This can be accomplished by growing the number of nuclear-capable submarines, and the fastest way to accomplish this is to arm fast attack submarines (SSN) with nuclear-capable Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM-N) based on the Tomahawk cruise missile.
Accelerate Conventional Hypersonic Strike Capability – The U.S. must quickly develop its hypersonic technology to hold adversary targets at risk as counter-missile technology progresses. The U.S. should continue to develop hypersonics as conventional weapons but should provision designs to enable rapid adaptation to employ nuclear weapons. Doing so would provide the U.S. with the ability to match adversary nuclearization of hypersonics and would provide a credible tradeoff for future arms negotiations.
Recommendations for Nuclear Security Enterprise Infrastructure
Build Capacity to Support a GPC Strategy – Develop an updated NSE infrastructure modernization plan scoped to support a GPC strategy. This plan must consider the robust capability and capacity of the NSE itself as a key component of deterrence and as an independent requirement beyond any requirements derived from current posture needs.
Boost NSE Infrastructure Investment – The Executive Branch should advocate for and Congress should appropriate additional funding for NSE infrastructure investment, including, at a minimum, all funding required to cover overruns and schedule slips against the current modernization plan as well as funding to expand the NSE infrastructure modernization program to one appropriately scoped to support a GPC strategy.
Develop NSE Workforce – Options for flexible work arrangements and attractive incentives such as performance-based pay raises and employee assistance packages must be standardized recruitment and retention tools across the NSE.
Develop and Cultivate a Mission-Driven Culture – Highlighting the importance of the NSE mission and the critical role STEM work has in its success will inspire and engage future employees for generations.
Create Buy-In at All Levels –NNSA should begin implementing programs that create opportunities for buy-in at all levels for current and future NNSA mission planning.
Recommendations Beyond the U.S. Nuclear Enterprise
Exploit the Benefits of Digital Design – Digital design tools have changed what is possible when designing complex systems, and the DoD and NNSA should exploit digital design tools to the fullest extent possible.
Invest in Technology AND Capacity –The DoD and DOE/NNSA should invest directly in additional capacity for casting and forging and similar cross-cutting bottlenecks in parallel with coordinated investment into promising new technologies.
Protect Sensitive Technology Transfer – Nationally coordinated basic security clearances should be required for individuals conducting research identified as sensitive in order to mitigate the risk posed by potential insider threats and to signal the importance the federal government places on the work.
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