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Industry Study**

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*Reconstruction and Vital
Infrastructure Industry*



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RECONSTRUCTION AND VITAL INFRASTRUCTURE 2008

ABSTRACT: The reconstruction and vital infrastructure industry encompasses public and private entities that provide essential security, governance, economic, and humanitarian services in post-crisis and developing countries. The industry includes U.S. and foreign governments, international and regional bodies, nongovernmental organizations, for-profit companies, think tanks and academia. This paper considers how the U.S. government can best leverage this “industry” for reconstruction and development efforts that support U.S. policy and national interests. The U.S. government must reform its internal organization and processes for planning, coordination, resourcing, and implementing development assistance programs. It must take the initiative to collaborate with international institutions and build coalitions that improve donor coordination, standardize best practices, and assist foreign governments in making the reforms necessary for international assistance to benefit their citizens.

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PLACES VISITED:

Domestic:

Craney Island Fuel Terminal, Norfolk, VA
Blackwater USA, Moycock, NC
The Louis Berger Group, Inc., Washington, DC
URS Corporation, Washington, DC
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
Save the Children, Washington, DC
World Bank, Washington, DC
United Nations Peacekeeping Support Office, New York, NY
Australian Mission to the UN, New York, NY
Office of Emergency Management, New York, NY
Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY
US Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans, LA
US Coast Guard, New Orleans, LA
Port Fourchon, LA
Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, Galliano, LA

International:

Group 5, Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa
Port of Maputo, Mozambique
U.S. Embassy Mozambique, Maputo, Mozambique
Higher Institute for International Relations (ISRI), Maputo, Mozambique
USAID, Maputo, Mozambique
Confederation of Business Associations (CTA), Mozambique
Mozal Aluminium Company, Maputo, Mozambique
FIPAG Water Company, Maputo, Mozambique
U.S. Embassy Swaziland, Mbabane, Swaziland
Baylor Pediatric AIDS Clinic, Mbabane, Swaziland
TechnoServe, Mbabane, Swaziland
Swaziland Electricity Company, Mbabane, Swaziland
Nokwane Clinic, Swaziland Defense Force, Mbabane, Swaziland
Maguga Dam, Swaziland
Royal Swazi Police Service (RSPS) College, Mbabane, Swaziland

1.0 Introduction

On May 16, 2008, the Texas-based Ayr Development Group signed a \$5.5 million deal with the South African construction firm Group 5 to build an oil refinery at the port of Nacala in northern Mozambique. The project, which was endorsed by members of Mozambique's government, will also include a vocational training center and other enterprises to develop the port into a key industrial center and help realize the potential of the "Nacala Development Corridor" linking Malawi and Zambia to the port.¹ The private-sector initiative could be the biggest boost to the Mozambican economy since the opening of the Mozal aluminum smelting plant in 2000, located outside the capital city of Maputo. That single operation, run by an international consortium, has doubled Mozambique's exports and contributes a third of the country's economic growth.²

These examples of foreign direct investment in a country that was consumed by civil war less than two decades ago contribute to Mozambique's reputation as a post-conflict development success story. Since the Cold War-era conflict ended, the "Donor's Republic of Mozambique" has been lavished with international assistance, receiving billions of dollars from the United States government (USG), other governments, the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, and independent non-government organizations (NGOs). The State Department, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), requested over \$281 million for the country – with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) pledging an additional \$260 million over the next five years. Yet for all Mozambique's progress and attention, it still ranks almost at the very bottom (168 out of 177) of the UN Development Program Human Development Index and the country's prevalence of AIDS among adults is roughly 16%, one of the highest levels in the world.³

Does Mozambique really represent the best the USG—working with the entire global development community—can do? If Mozambique is a success, what are the prospects for Liberia, Swaziland, Afghanistan, Iraq and the other members of the "bottom billion" that are the target of USG assistance (and in some cases, military intervention/occupation)?

This paper draws upon lessons learned from sub-Saharan Africa and other case studies, as well as recent academic analyses, to consider how the USG can best leverage "industry" for such post-conflict reconstruction and other development efforts. It concludes that reforming USG organization, planning and coordination, resourcing, and implementation of the development assistance process is necessary for significant improvements in reconstruction efforts. The paper defines the reconstruction and vital infrastructure industry, surveys current USG policy and processes for the mission, assesses USG effectiveness and industry capacity across key reconstruction/development sectors, and identifies enterprise-level policy recommendations. In addressing these major subject areas, this paper uses the five Post-conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks identified by the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) as a high-level structural framework. It is important to note, however, that this paper is not intended to provide an analysis of the S/CRS model itself or its identified sub-tasks.

2.0 Background

The central question to any study of post-conflict reconstruction is a fundamental one: why do it? Of course, there is no single answer, but several studies led by economist Paul Collier indicate that four out of ten post-conflict societies revert to conflict within the first ten years of

peace.⁴ Left unchecked, post-crisis issues can also devolve into humanitarian tragedy, widespread crime, and lawlessness, which can often spread to neighboring states, thus exacerbating an already severe (albeit localized) situation. Even seemingly obscure conflicts can pose significant threats to U.S. partners and allies, restrict access to essential resources, and potentially impact the domestic and global economies. While the U.S. is neither capable nor obligated to intervene directly in every crisis, it is clear that the lack of a timely and coordinated response to post-conflict reconstruction issues can place U.S. strategic interests at risk.⁵

That said, the USG's performance in post-conflict reconstruction over the past two decades has been far less than exemplary. Interventions from Panama to Afghanistan and Iraq have magnified the serious gap that exists between the USG's post-conflict strategy and its ability to plan, coordinate, and execute the strategy. History has also demonstrated the unfortunate consequences of an ad-hoc response—particularly from the non-Department of Defense (DoD) agencies. Shortfalls in U.S. civilian capability to plan and coordinate “whole of government” recovery strategies have, in turn placed a heavy burden on the military to lead the effort until long-term development agencies can take over. This strategy was neither desirable nor sustainable. Therefore, as early as 2004, the Bush administration began changing its earlier views about the importance of planning for post-conflict/crisis reconstruction and stability operations, and subsequently reframed both U.S. security and international development policy. Over the last several years, this shift in policy has brought about some dramatic changes to USG structures and practices aimed at improving reconstruction and stability capabilities.

One of the first transformative measures launched by the Bush administration in 2004 was to officially appoint the Department of State (DoS) as the U.S. federal lead for reconstruction and stability planning and coordination. Subsequently, in December 2005, the administration codified reconstruction and stability responsibilities across the whole of government by issuing National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44). The purpose of NSPD-44 was to “improve the coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife... These improved capabilities should enable the U.S. to help governments abroad exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.”⁶

NSPD-44 specifies that “the Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States government efforts, involving all USG departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”⁷ These operations may be conducted with or without a U.S. military engagement. However, when the U.S. military is involved, “the Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. The United States shall work with other countries and organizations, to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law.”⁸ It also requires the Department of State to lead the development of a civilian response capability, including the capacity to ensure that the U.S. can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises.⁹

S/CRS is the linchpin of the U.S. government's post-conflict planning and coordination effort. Yet, nearly four years into the process of building the S/CRS and a whole-of-government

planning and coordination capability, there is still much work to be done. Several recently released reports provide a detailed analysis of the current level of organization and training within the S/CRS, and are critical of its current state of progress.¹⁰ In summary, there are several issues the S/CRS must address if it is to meet its mandate: the authority to direct interagency action related to reconstruction and stabilization, greatly increased planning capabilities and capacity, a more well-defined manning authority, increased training, and funding commensurate with its mission—possibly the most important step the administration and Congress can take to improve the capabilities of the S/CRS is to fund it commensurate with their rhetoric.¹¹

The administration and Congress have officially stated that S/CRS's mission and major functions are important, yet they have not made the organization a funding priority. In an attempt to compensate for these shortfalls, DoD has reprogrammed \$100 million to S/CRS for this and the next two fiscal years. In relative terms, however, this is a very modest amount. One hundred million dollars represents roughly thirty minutes worth of expenditures of the over \$2 billion per week DoD is spending in Iraq.¹² S/CRS has requested \$248.6 million for FY 09.¹³ Whether Congress will approve this amount remains to be seen. While S/CRS has the potential to substantially improve U.S. post-conflict reconstruction planning and coordination capabilities, progress will be impossible without suitable and sustained funding. Despite these challenges, S/CRS has made substantial progress over the last several years in the area of post-conflict "doctrine" and procedures. Working with U.S. Joint Forces Command, S/CRS has led an interagency group of sixteen U.S. agencies to create a framework for developing specific reconstruction and stabilization plans.¹⁴

The post-conflict environment is exceedingly complex, with a host of competing forces. Poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, and ethnic- or religious-based violence can all further complicate already challenging situations. It is not surprising, then, that the industry which has emerged to address reconstruction and vital infrastructure issues is equally complex and multifaceted.

2.1 The Industry Defined

Unlike more traditional industries, such as telecommunications and shipbuilding, the reconstruction and vital infrastructure (RVI) industry seems to defy universally accepted definition. This is due to the fact that it encompasses a broad range of products and services, spanning multiple sectors and multiple focus areas—from immediate crisis response through long-term recovery. Defining this particular industry, therefore, is perhaps best driven by an interpretation of scope.

For the purposes of this study, the reconstruction and vital infrastructure industry is defined as those entities, both public and private, that provide resources, products, and services across one or more of S/CRS's Post-conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks: security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation. This includes foreign and domestic governmental departments and agencies, international organizations, regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, for-profit companies, think tanks, and academia (see Appendix A for more information).

Many of the entities listed above provide similar, or even overlapping, resources, products, and services. However, some regularly take independent action during post-crisis situations, while others require consensus building prior to engagement. Some are extremely well funded,

while others are frequently under resourced. Some are agile, and some are heavily bureaucratic. Despite their differences and similarities, they are all key players in the reconstruction and vital infrastructure domain; and it is the interaction between these key players—and the prospect of harnessing their collective capability—that strikes at the heart of this study.

3.0 RVI Industry Analysis

The following section provides the RVI study group's in-depth analysis, observations, and recommendations for the industry. As previously noted, this section utilizes the S/CRS Post-conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks as a high-level structural framework.

3.1 Security

Security is a critical component of reconstruction and vital infrastructure. In fact, many experts agree that security ranks among “the first-order priorities” for any nation-building mission.¹⁵ It is important to note, however, that security in a post-conflict scenario is not singularly focused; it consists of several essential tasks, each of which is addressed in the subsequent paragraphs.

The disposition of armed and other security forces, intelligence services, and belligerents requires sufficient forces to enforce peace agreements, disarm and demobilize belligerents, train host-nation forces, and reintegrate combatants into civil society.¹⁶ In conducting such operations, a country's security environment, size of the population, and geographical attributes will drive the scope of the mission.¹⁷ Two notable examples include Kosovo and Mozambique. When the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) continued to operate as a quasi-military organization even after thousands of weapons were seized by Kosovo Force (KFOR), the KFOR solution was to demilitarize the KLA by converting it into a civil emergency service agency called the Kosovo Corps (KPC).¹⁸ When the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) intervened to monitor the 1992 peace agreement between the government and Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana (RENAMO), one of its top priorities was disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the two combatants into civil society. The success of the effort was, in large part, due to the attractive financial incentives offered by the UN, as well as the fact that most of the combatants had grown weary after 17 years of internal conflict.¹⁹ The core philosophy behind this approach is significant: when belligerents support the peace process, the cost of the intervention can be ten times less in resources than those with unwilling parties.²⁰

Additionally, there must be sufficient forces to establish border (i.e., territorial) security at the major points of entry, which includes building a customs regime to prevent arms trafficking, interdicting contraband, preventing human trafficking, and regulating immigration.²¹ Securing the border can diminish the revenue streams of obstructers to peace, directly impacting their ability to sustain coercion, terror, paramilitary operations, and intelligence activities.²²

Protecting non-combatants, policing, and de-mining (see section 3.3) are also paramount to establishing public order and safety.²³ The successful implementation of these tasks affords the population a layer of protection against both foreign and domestic threats. In extreme scenarios such as Kosovo, there were no police, judges, or prisons, and the intervening force had to be prepared to exercise full executive policing authority and be capable of performing other functions essential to establishing the rule of law, such as operating a court system and corrections service (see section 3.5). Since it took over a year to mobilize sufficient international civilian resources for administering justice and law enforcement in Kosovo, the military was required to perform law-enforcement, judicial, and penal functions.²⁴ The significant

requirements for these tasks may require more military police units and a commitment to train general purpose forces in the Army and Marine Corps to support civil law enforcement. This includes tasks commonly associated with constabulary forces. Nevertheless, the ultimate goal is to transition the responsibilities to either international and/or host-nation police forces.

A stabilization force must also protect indigenous individuals, infrastructure, and institutions. This includes private institutions and key leaders, critical facilities, and military bases.²⁵ What the intervening force chooses to protect or not can have strategic impact. In the Middle East, for example, there is a perception that the U.S. directly or indirectly supports corrupt regimes, due to its strategic interest in oil.²⁶ This perception was exacerbated by the U.S. decision to only protect Iraq's Oil Ministry during the early days of the Iraq invasion.²⁷ U.S. civilians working reconstruction and stabilization, as well as their facilities, must also be protected. This includes contractors and nongovernmental organizations (NGO).²⁸ This effort is essential because without civilians having the ability to operate in non-secure environments, they cannot help shape conditions for improved security. In Iraq, the cost of out-sourcing security for non-DoD U.S. government agencies became almost "prohibitive." Additionally, the U.S. military's ad-hoc approach to providing security for civilians caused inevitable delays and adjustments of schedules. This led to a larger debate between DoS and DoD over "whether to use military or contract guards to provide security and who should pay."²⁹ In short, if the military is unwilling to provide security, it should not expect its civilian counterparts to be more effective post-Iraq and Afghanistan, even when they are on the ground and in sufficient numbers.

This begs the question: does the U.S. military have the resources to provide security to NGOs and contractors? The answer largely depends on the size of the reconstruction and stabilization effort. During large-scale engagements, the military may not have adequate resources to protect all contractors and NGOs. In addition, given their mission-driven need for impartiality, many NGOs deliberately avoid close ties with the military and choose to protect themselves. Furthermore, some private companies have adopted effective business strategies to protect their interests during post-conflict environments. Group 5, mentioned in the introduction of this study, continues to operate successfully in unstable post-conflict environments without military security. Instead, their "Three P's Strategy" (people, planet, and profit) helps them to gain the support of the local community by seeking direct input and investing in local housing, schools, training facilities, and other beneficial infrastructure. This unique approach ensures that the local community has a vested interest in the success of Group 5's projects, which significantly decreases the need for large-scale security measures.³⁰ When the military lacks the capacity to protect all the civilians involved in reconstruction efforts, some will have to rely on Privatized Military Operations (PMO) firms for security. This may require the U.S. government to engage the PMO industry to establish standards for contract language, standards of conduct, and vetting procedures for company personnel.³¹

The intervening force must also conduct effective coordination with international security forces, provide intelligence support, coordinate with indigenous security forces, share information with civilians, and negotiate regional security arrangements.³² For a number of years, there was an almost "systemic aversion to the use of intelligence in UN operations."³³ However, collecting and sharing local intelligence between military and civilian police officials in Kosovo significantly enhanced security operations.³⁴ More importantly, the UN Security Council directed the military and civilian leaders to coordinate closely in Kosovo, whereas the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia included "only a single mention of coordination between

the civilian and military components.”³⁵ Finally, security information must be disseminated to provide information and control rumors.³⁶ It must be made clear, through the use of various media outlets, that successful reconstruction requires implementing key strategies of conflict transformation to dislodge violence-prone power structures and restoring legitimate government institutions.³⁷ As was the case of Kosovo, this may require the intervening authority to boldly state that it “supports those who support implementation of the [international] mandate and opposes those who do not.” In other words, the interveners “will not be neutral about bad behavior that obstructs the peace process,” and will use “all necessary means” to remove the obstructionists (see section 3.2).³⁸


In conclusion, it is clear there are many security tasks that can be performed by international organizations, regional powers, NGOs, and for-profit companies, and the U.S. should continue to leverage the totality of the industry to perform some of the tasks in this sector. However, the U.S. should also continue to develop and/or maintain the capacity to perform the majority of these security-related tasks. This capacity is needed especially during the initial period following the intervention, when the obstructionists are unsure of their future and resistance is unorganized. Only when the U.S. has sufficient security capacity will it be able to “capitalize on these opportunities.”³⁹ Even when U.S. planners foresee requirements for international civilian law enforcement to control the border and to perform policing duties, it often takes far too long to mobilize. As a result, having the military capacity to train local military, police, and border security forces is essential to establishing security and building capacity to foster sustainability.

3.1.1 Recommendations

- S/CRS should be more adequately resourced to effectively leverage the security sector of the RVI industry to fill the gap.
- Until sufficient capacity exists to perform police and border security duties in a post-conflict environment, the U.S. military should be prepared to perform a wide range of policing duties that are commonly associated with constabulary forces.
- Until sufficient capacity exists within the industry to train indigenous military, police, and border security forces in a post-conflict environment, the U.S. military should institutionalize this capability within a general purpose force by creating a “specialized training brigade.”
- The U.S. military should also commit to protecting U.S. government civilians working reconstruction and stabilization, and their facilities.
- The U.S. government should engage the PMO industry to establish standards for contract language, standards of conduct, and vetting procedures for company personnel.

3.2 Governance

Successful reconstruction and stabilization efforts rely on the establishment of good governance. In fact, besides enforced peace, effective governance is the greatest predictor of a successful transition and the enduring ability to avoid renewed conflict.⁴⁰ Comprehensive studies by key experts, practitioners, and leaders of nations emerging from conflict cite the governance tasks depicted in graphic below as essential.



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Not only must policy attend to and support these essential governance tasks, but time is of the essence. It is estimated that the “golden hour,” or that time immediately following the end of conflict, “in which governance and social institutions are vulnerable to change, and reform is possible” lasts only six months.⁴² It is in this short time that a country is malleable enough for effective governance to take root and replace the conflict-associated regime and associated governmental mechanisms. It is in the national interest of the U.S. to capitalize on this opportunity to build alliances and stabilize unrest through the establishment of representative governance.

3.2.1 Role of Governance in Reconstruction and Vital Infrastructure

Establishing representative government is the focus of multiple international agencies. These organizations work to establish representative governance; civic development, and an “electoral process with broader constitutional reform, parliamentary strengthening, [and] civic education.”⁴³ In post-conflict environments, the feeling of empowerment and membership generated by representation in government is an important factor for enduring peace. If citizens have a stake in governance, they are less likely to return to conflict as a means of addressing their grievances. Although free and fair elections are not the first step in establishing effective governance, they are one of the end goals to ensuring political—rather than violent—resolution of differences.

Garnering the commitment and buy in of the international community is essential. Noted African development expert and Oxford economist Paul Collier recommends the creation of international charters to develop operating principles to address democracy, fiscal transparency, reconciliation, corruption, and the disease and migration that attends conflict.⁴⁴ The U.S. possesses the influence and economic power necessary to lead its international partners and near-peer competitors in building these agreed-upon operating principles. Although not legally binding, international consensus is powerful, and the principles generated will allow both first- and developing-world nations to understand the rules of obtaining and maintaining legitimized governance.

Similarly, regional organizations (African Union, South African Development Council, et al.) and several other partnership entities play a guiding and supportive role in capitalizing on the “golden hour.” Often, conflict spreads from “bad neighbor” nations to peaceful countries, and a

broader level of legitimate authority is needed to arbitrate. Empowering these associations and their peacekeeping forces to intercede is the first step to increasing autonomy and decreasing direct military involvement. Again, the establishment of good governance follows the end of conflict and typically coincides with peacekeeping. Interestingly, once the post-conflict environment is stabilized and the emphasis shifts to the establishment of governance, communication gains in importance and effectiveness.

3.2.2 The Strategic Role of Communications in Governance

The path to representative governance is paved with openness and transparency. Throughout the transition from stabilization to development within a post-conflict society, public information and communication ensures the community continues on a positive trajectory toward recovery. According to John P. Kotter, “communicating for buy-in” is one of the key elements needed for successful large-scale change.

Public information and communication serves as a coordinating mechanism that allows the society to prioritize, harmonize, and sequence external assistance along with internal actions during the initial stages of stabilization. The community, along with their external benefactors, can employ public information and communication in an effort to develop a coherent security strategy, define and establish objectives for initial recovery, plan for long-term economic and infrastructure development, and move toward national unity and reconciliation. Once political authority is established, public information and communication builds solidarity, provides a positive mechanism through which grievances can be addressed, and restores social capital within the community that ultimately leads to broad-based participation. This broad-based participation then leads to consensus and establishes political legitimacy within the society. Once established, the political legitimacy of the nation builds confidence in the security and economic environment, which ultimately leads to increased direct foreign investment, additional donor assistance, and further mobilization of domestic and external resources.

Many see “access to information” as a “universal right.”⁴⁵ The mechanism for communicating public information is highly dependent upon the infrastructure present within the community. Many societies enjoy modern communications systems, ranging from broadcast to print mediums. Others rely upon more primitive methods such as word-of-mouth and personal interaction to transmit their message. Regardless of the mechanism, the freedom to access accurate information is an essential element in the development of a transparent and sustained ability to govern. The ability to coordinate and manage the processes of government is a fundamental precursor to social and economic development, as well as the establishment of individual rights and a sense of ownership of the governance process within a community.

The USG has made several attempts to employ industry capacity for public information and communication actions. Unfortunately, recent USG attempts at “outsourcing” public information and communication tasks, such as employing Anteon in the Balkans to run a news website or the Lincoln Group to coordinate news stories in Iraq, were viewed as counter to the American tenets of freedom of the press and freedom of expression.⁴⁶ Even when public information and communication activities were tasked to a government organization, such as in 2002 through the DoD’s Office of Strategic Influence, the perception both home and abroad was that the effort was nothing more than a packaging of “military propaganda.”⁴⁷ At one time, the USG did have an organization dedicated to overseeing public information and communication overseas. The U.S. Information Agency was tasked with producing information programs to support U.S.

policy and national interests, but the agency was eliminated in 1999. Since then, the USG's attempts to influence perceptions abroad through strategic communications have been far less coordinated and effective. While the wholesale reestablishment of a dedicated government agency is not necessary, the designation of a lead entity for funding and managing strategic communications would be highly beneficial. This entity could be augmented by appropriate private sector components within the RVI industry, such as media consultants, public relations firms, etc. In addition to creating a definitive center of gravity for overseas public information and communications, this approach would buttress country-specific governance mentorship programs already in place, and help the community develop appropriate, positive, and beneficial relationships between the government, media, and society at large.

3.2.3 The Industry of Governance

As with many service-oriented industries, the “governance industry” consists of two fields: capability enhancement and capacity development. Capability can be provided either through wholesale insertion of a governance structure (used in the instance where there is no working government), or as a supplemental service to enhance and develop the core services already present in the post-conflict nation. Capacity, conversely, develops a specified community of knowledge, directed toward a desired end state. This end state can be civic-minded citizens, police, justices, or social workers. Training programs can be conducted while mentoring or capability-enhancement programs are in place, or can be conducted separately.

The governance industry, as a component of the broader RVI industry, is diverse and comprised of a multitude of public and private entities. Public organizations include international government organizations, individual governmental agencies, and regional organizations. While a substantial amount of governance support is provided through these three governmental organizations, each consistently reaches back to private organizations for expertise and/or capacity, either through direct funding or by coordinating resources. Private sector members of the governance industry consist of non-governmental organizations, consultancy firms, universities, and think tanks.

Many international, regional and national governments are becoming more involved in “nation building” activities, creating a plethora of skilled staff in this area. However, governance mentoring requires social *and* technical skills, as well techniques and tools that are just now being codified into a structure. Experts with decades of experience in governance are scarce. However, caring individuals willing to work in the field and help nations progress into a lasting peace are plentiful. More companies and universities across the nation and in the world are embracing the topic of governance as a field of study and career path. As the U.S. expands its role in governance throughout the world, it must continue to develop the capabilities to meet the demand.

3.2.5 Recommendations

- Develop international charters that, in principle, synchronize international approaches to governance, corruption, and trade. The effects of conflict permeate the media, globalized markets, national debt, and, if military is committed, citizen's lives. There is a direct link to corruption, especially in the natural resource and construction trades, that causes regimes and populations to implode. Additionally, the lack of norms or charters regarding international intervention and assistance in post-conflict countries creates an aid “feast or famine,” undermining the best efforts and intentions of the international community. In a world with

multiple post-conflict nations, the lack of synchronized and principled action not only undermines the effectiveness of the aid supplied; it provides parasitic entities the opportunity to exploit the nation weakened by conflict. The world must voluntarily police itself by denying continued corruption and, through unity of action and purpose, empower failing nations to flourish. International charters provide legitimate grounds on which countries may challenge the questionable practices of their partners and the international community as a whole.

- Appoint a lead governmental entity for funding, coordinating, and managing overseas strategic communications, which could be augmented, as appropriate, by components of the broader RVI industry, such as media consultants, public relations firms, and NGOs.
- Enact a trust-fund-like account of several hundred million, which can to be used by DoS or DoD, as warranted, once the USG has declared its involvement in a reconstruction effort. As demonstrated by the funding issues in Iraq and Afghanistan, the current acquisition system was developed for weapons acquisition or for the purchase of goods and services for use under a controlled environment and within the business constraints presented within the U.S. However, post-conflict reconstruction acquisition is conducted under significantly different constraints – usually a reduced timeline, unreliable or inexperienced suppliers and subcontractors, a questionable indigenous logistics capability, and an unsafe environment. Additionally, work in reconstruction involves interagency teams, requiring close coordination between agencies for success. Acquisition reform for post-conflict reconstruction is needed to enable this necessary coordination, not hinder it. It must be flexible and fast enough to capitalize on the “golden hour” and address the changing needs on the ground yet structured enough to provide the competition and transparency necessary to guarantee good contract governance, value, and Congressional oversight.
- Create a systems approach to reporting development-related funding from all sources (including external governments and private sources). The U.S. budget is authorized by program and project. Too often, programs are funded without a holistic view of how the program fits in the larger view of a national strategy, and how this larger view supports, or possibly inhibits, the strategic interests of the United States. The DoD and the DoS can help lead Congress toward a systems approach of funding by reporting funds and progress in a systems manner. For example, rather than reporting governance support by the individual fund or program, present the information by nation. This systems-level analysis would demonstrate to Congress how the budget for each nation is allocated in accordance with U.S. interests in the specific nation or region. Further, including external funding sources with USG funding reports provides the USG and Congress with a full understanding of how the world is addressing these common problems.

3.3 Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being

Vital infrastructure, as defined in the larger scope of this paper, is not merely the compilation of a country’s tangible assets such as road networks, energy systems, and economic viability. A country’s most affected asset is its population. How a country in a post-conflict environment treats the people within its borders is an important consideration that must be accounted for in order for the government to fully develop and for the country to move beyond its period of crisis. The humanitarian assistance and social well-being programs provided to a country recovering from a crisis are resourced through a number of international and non-governmental

organizations. All of these programs, while well intentioned, are not well coordinated nor are they efficiently resourced. In some areas, the assistance programs overlap, while in others there are gaps in coverage. During a recent visit to South Africa, Mozambique, and Swaziland, the RVI industry study group had the opportunity to experience first-hand the importance organizations such as the Peace Corps have played in assisting countries to develop a social system for the less-fortunate citizens. It was evident that the care of the less fortunate, for the most part, was under-resourced. For example, following the closing of the Peace Corps mission in the Kingdom of Swaziland, government officials specifically asked the Peace Corps to return to assist in providing and/or distributing critical resources such as water, food, and medical supplies. The involvement of the USG in the planning, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian development assistance programs is needed for success in these areas. S/CRS has identified ten essential tasks dealing with humanitarian assistance and social well-being programs. They include health issues (specifically HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria); refugee management and internally displaced persons; and humanitarian demining. The RVI industry study group considers these three tasks to be the most challenging humanitarian crises that post-conflict countries face now and in the future; and thus, these initiatives will be explored further.

3.3.1 Health Crisis

The high incidence of Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and Tuberculosis (TB) within southern Africa has overwhelmed the public health sector. The capacity of public health services directly impacts the physical well-being of the population, in general, and the workforce in particular, which ultimately affects the overall economic vitality of the country. The resulting negative impact has underscored the importance of revitalizing health services during reconstruction efforts. Nowhere is the negative impact more evident than in Swaziland, which, at 38.8 percent, has the world's highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate.⁴⁸ Compounding the HIV/AIDS crisis, high instances of TB in Swaziland compound the public health problem. HIV/AIDS lowers the body's defenses, greatly increasing susceptibility to infection through exposure to TB. In Swaziland, TB is one of the top causes of morbidity and the leading cause of mortality in adults. The annual TB case notification was 1,262 cases per 10,000 people in 2005.⁴⁹ The number of new infectious TB cases is increasing each year, primarily due to the high prevalence of HIV infection in the country. Unfortunately, the detection rate for new cases of TB is declining at the same time. As a result, TB continues to spread, and patients tend to seek medical care in the later stages of the disease when treatment is far less effective.

HIV/AIDS is negatively affecting Swaziland's health systems, as rising morbidity increases the patient loads at all levels. Demand for medical services increases while at the same time there is a parallel reduction in capacity.⁵⁰ The rising TB prevalence is compounding this public health crisis. Administering state-of-the-art antiretroviral therapy (ART) is placing a significant additional strain on current public health systems.⁵¹ Hospitals are working beyond their capacity. The RVI industry study group visited a pediatric clinic, run by Baylor University, in Swaziland and the staff estimated the clinic sees an average of 84 patients daily. Medical follow-up treatment is primarily administered through the family support structure. However, one of the more troubling issues faced is the growing number of orphans who have lost this parental support as a result of HIV/AIDS. The clinical staff must account for this increase in needed care in addition to the normal patient load. Since the late 1990s, there has been a rapid increase in the

demand for hospital and clinic beds. ART treatment should reduce the number of deaths and reduce impacts across society; yet, only 28% of those in need are receiving ART treatment.⁵² Many resources that should be dedicated to building capacity have been diverted to ensure the success of HIV/AIDS treatment programs. HIV/AIDS patients are more susceptible to opportunistic infections, which further complicates the medical treatment they must receive. The demand for services over the next ten years will continue to grow. This increased demand will place additional strain on staff and distract them from providing other health and support services, which could further demoralize the remaining staff and contribute to the migration of health workers away from Swaziland.

HIV/AIDS and TB are permanently altering the structure of Swazi society. By 2025, there will be a thinning of both the older age groups and the very young. Deaths among the productive age groups are increasing dependency of the very young on their elders. This affects economic growth because the workforce continues to shrink. Life expectancy fell from 60 years in 1997 to 31.3 years in 2004 -- the world's lowest.⁵³ This short-term outlook creates problems for development. Since there is no reason to save for the future, short-term consumption increases, and long-term savings and investment in both physical and human capital accumulation decrease. A long-term outlook is generally required for economic growth. HIV/AIDS undercuts the fabric of the society by causing long-term sickness and death among the productive adults who would be the ones to assist communities during a crisis. HIV/AIDS and TB divert workers from performing productive work and earning an income, many staying at home and caring for family members who are ill. It also places an additional financial burden on them by forcing them to divert their reduced income to pay for their family members' increased medical expenses. Family members are forced to sell their assets or borrow money to cope.

The U.S. Embassy in Swaziland has organized a USG task force to help coordinate the growing HIV/AIDS activities in Swaziland. Members of the first task force include the Ambassador and staff from the U.S. Embassy, USAID, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services – Centers for Disease Control (HHS – CDC), the U.S. DoD, and the Peace Corps. Future task forces are planned to include the U.S. Department of Labor, the African Development Fund, and other USG agencies that support HIV/AIDS programs in Swaziland.⁵⁴ These coordination efforts focus on coordinating the humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. organizations are a step in the right direction; however, the emphasis should be shifted more globally in order to coordinate the efforts of all of our international partners.

3.3.2 Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

The importance of recognizing, controlling, and caring for the plight of civilians affected by conflict or crisis is paramount for a country to heal in the aftermath of its turmoil. “International [and internal] migration is an important dimension of globalization, and has become increasingly embedded in changes in global economies and social structures.”⁵⁵ The United Nations Commission on Displaced Persons estimated in 2005 that there were approximately 200 million people⁵⁶ that could be classified as international migrants. Refugees fleeing their home country for a foreign sanctuary during times of political upheaval or war are but a subset of the aforementioned population. While the refugees' displacement from their home country eliminates their direct involvement in the ongoing conflict or crisis, their presence in the “hosting” country gives rise to a number of social problems. For instance, it is estimated that the ongoing conflict in Zimbabwe creates an influx of refugees into South Africa, a country in a post-crisis environment, at a rate in excess of 1,000 persons per day, as briefed to the RVI

industry study group during an overview of the South African situation. Taken over the entire period of this conflict, the flood of refugees of this magnitude further exacerbates the strain on South Africa's already fragile infrastructure.

One of the core competencies of a sovereign state is the integrity of its borders. Normally if governance fails, borders will invariably close. However, when the border in question separates a country in conflict from a country recovering from a crisis, there will be gaps in coverage and security. Refugees are protected under internationally accepted laws and conventions; these regulations provide a framework under which refugees may be repatriated once the causes for emigration have been resolved.⁵⁷ In order for refugees to be fully protected by these regulations, host countries must be fully aware of the people's plight and status. In the case of South Africa, the "irregular"⁵⁸ immigrants have infiltrated urban centers. They are now full competitors for the scarce resources of food, shelter, and employment. The refugees have spurred an internal migration of the indigenous population in search of a more abundant source of the basic requirements of life. Those who stay behind must coexist with the refugees; this coexistence is not always peaceful. The situation in Zimbabwe has caused a resurgence of violence in South Africa that is "reminiscent of the bloodiest days of apartheid [wherein] most of the victims [are] foreigners in squatter camps" that have been unofficially organized.⁵⁹ During the RVI group's visit to South Africa, it was evident to the even a casual observer that the city of Johannesburg has become a haven for undocumented refugees. The local population seemed to all but abandon the city center for more advantageous suburbs.

S/CRS has identified that host countries need assistance in establishing registration and screening mechanisms for refugees as they are resettled into temporary locations. If no other options exist for the host country to absorb the population influx, the international community should assist to establish camps that recognize physical, economic, social, and security considerations. There are many non-governmental organizations well prepared to provide food and medical care; what is often lacking is an overarching framework under which this, and other, assistance may be provided while conducting long-range plans for the eventual repatriation and/or resettlement of the refugees. A thorough plan for dealing with refugees has the added benefit of minimizing the tensions with the native population and should reduce instances of internal migration and violence.

3.3.3 Humanitarian Demining

A critical task to undertake early on in a post-conflict recovery is the removal of land mines. There are approximately 26,000 lives lost annually—one every twenty minutes—to anti-personnel mines.⁶⁰ The majority of the world's land mine victims are civilians who stumble onto these hidden weapons. A significant number of deaths from anti-personnel mines occur long after the war or conflict is over. It is the young girl going to school years after the conflict ended who accidentally steps on a mine. It is the local farmer trying to provide a living for his family who cannot cultivate his fields due to mines. There are at least 100 million active mines in more than 80 countries around the world. An estimated 55 countries including the United States continue to produce anti-personnel mines. In 1992, the United States became the first country to stop exporting land mines. The Ottawa Treaty, championed by the late Diana, Princess of Wales, when she visited Angola in January 1997 bans production, sale, and use of anti-personnel mines.⁶¹ As of November 2007, the treaty has been signed by 158 countries; 37 states including the People's Republic of China, India, Russia and the United States are not party to the convention.⁶²

Unfortunately, at the current rate of removal by private industry and non-governmental organizations, it will take 450-500 years to rid the world of landmines, and that estimate assumes that no more will be placed.⁶³ In Mozambique, the civil war between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO opposition resulted in mines being laid by both sides. The government used anti-personnel mines to defend provincial and district towns, airstrips, key bridges, power supplies and military posts - while RENAMO laid anti-vehicle mines to close the roads connecting towns and markets. Extensive minefields were laid along the border by both Portuguese and Rhodesian forces. It is estimated that 204 communities with a population of over 806,000 and approximately 171 kilometers are mined.⁶⁴ The mines are blocking arable land, and placed on critical infrastructure such as bridges, roads, power lines railroads and airports. Therefore, it becomes imperative that anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines be removed first in order to begin the reconstruction efforts post-crisis.

To reinforce the official USG efforts to make the world a safe place, the Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs encourages non-governmental organizations, civic associations, philanthropic foundations (Gates Foundation), educational institutions, and private corporations to participate in a Public-Private Partnership and lend their talent to removing and educating the global community on land-mines. Currently, there are over 60 non-governmental organizations involved in the program to alleviate the harmful impact of landmines.⁶⁵

A few U.S. firms, such as DynCorp, BACTEC International, and Armor Group, are also involved in de-mining operations. These commercial firms are funded for de-mining operations through their host government. The Department of State currently provides funding to DynCorp, for de-mining operations. The United Kingdom (UK) provides funding to BACTEC and Armor Group for de-mining operations. Finally, the U.S. State Department under the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement has developed a Public-Private Partnership initiative to bring new energy, ideas and resources to global mine action.

The Department of State spent over \$59 million on de-mining operations in fiscal year 2005. Over 60% of the companies involved in de-mining are operating in Southern Africa. In the FY 2005 budget for humanitarian demining program, \$9.7 million was for African countries and \$12 million went to South Asian countries.⁶⁶ Since 1993, the United States has spent over \$1.2 billion dollars in approximately 50 mine-affected countries and regions for clearance of mines, mine risk education, survivors' assistance, landmine surveys, and research and development on innovative ways to clear minefields.⁶⁷

3.3.4 Recommendations

- Form and lead an international consortium to eliminate use of anti-personal mines. A lesson learned in Iraq was that the use of a sensor-based identification field in lieu of an explosive mine field to assist in securing the borders significantly reduced casualties long after the cessation of hostilities on the borders. The USG should also leverage private industry to promote the use of this noninvasive technology by foreign militaries. Additionally, the consortium should champion a policy through the International Criminal Court aimed at penalizing any nation choosing to use anti-personnel landmines.
- Promote and resource the Peace Corps and other non-governmental organizations such as Save the Children and Doctors without Borders. These organizations are providing humanitarian assistance in post-conflict reconstruction activities at the request of U.S. and

foreign governments. They assist the host nation to understand the magnitude of social crises like HIV/AIDS and shortages in drinkable water and sufficient food stocks.

- Fully support a UN-led task force to develop and assist a region-wide humanitarian assistance program to reduce the infection rate of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. Current capabilities are US-centric and focused in Swaziland. This newly organized task force should expand its membership and resource regional organizations such as the South African Development Council (SADC) and international organizations, such as the World Health Organization.

3.4 Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure

Post-conflict reconstruction efforts begin with many important goals and objectives to achieve. None is more critical to national recovery than economic stability and infrastructure development. Clearly, economic stability is necessary for lasting recovery, self-governance and, ultimately, sustained economic growth. However, economic stability is neither a means nor an end unto itself. It requires specific enablers to take hold in a post conflict environment.

Basic functioning infrastructure enables a country to achieve economic stability. With basic infrastructure elements restored, such as transportation, water, and energy, recovery assistance can reach broader segments of society. Additionally, it provides the foundation mechanisms to build a more complex, robust national infrastructure supporting the economic recovery processes.

Through basic infrastructure improvements, communities become more resilient and better equipped to provide for their own needs. Improved self-reliance reduces dependency on aid for basic human needs and ultimately allows much-needed aid resources to be channeled toward longer-term initiatives such as training, education, trade, and entrepreneurial stewardship. As the community foundation is strengthened, an environment is created which encourages outside capital investment. Infrastructure development is a necessary condition for a society to evolve from aid to self-reliance to entrepreneurship, thereby leading to commercial and economic growth. Within this context, the USG must be prepared to respond in a relatively systematic and consistent approach that is flexible enough to adjust to each unique situation.

3.4.1 Economic Stability

As stated above, creating economic stability is a central goal of reconstruction efforts. Therefore, economic development programs receive considerable USG agency focus as compared with infrastructure development. This is evident in the funding allocated through foreign aid programs. What is lacking is coordinated planning and execution nested in the U.S. National Security Strategy. The USG depends on the Department of State to develop country action plans. Though the individual county plans may be robust, the mechanisms fail to deliver resources to the local and regional priorities. Nor are there guarantees that the embassy-developed action plan will translate into specific USAID investments. The challenges expand when viewed from outside the USG. Internationally speaking, there is no global coordinating body for the many economic stability contributors (governments, NGOs, private organizations), to ensure reconstruction efforts work toward a common goal.

3.4.2 Infrastructure Development

Throughout the reconstruction and vital infrastructure industry-study program, which included both domestic and international field analysis, the transportation infrastructure emerged as the most critical of the basic infrastructure elements. Basic transportation infrastructure includes roads and highways, air and seaports, waterways, and mass transit (rail and bus), and is an enabling network upon which all other infrastructure systems depend. The transportation network not only provides the population with necessary life-sustaining goods and services, it also creates the conditions for business development. The transportation network is the backbone upon which the local and national economies develop and thrive. Improved transportation infrastructure allows the transport of goods and services over greater distances, reaching new markets and increasing commercial viability. As a result, a greater portion of society is granted access to both essential life-supporting goods and relative luxury items, thereby raising universal living standards. These seemingly simple steps soon lead individuals and organizations to pursue greater endeavors such as mercantilism and simple production of goods and services for trade. Further, a robust transportation network increases trade among other communities and societies, spurring further entrepreneurial ventures. A developed transportation infrastructure has the single, greatest impact on a community by serving as a building block for other infrastructure development and for economic growth.

A consistent, safe water supply is the next highest priority in terms of basic infrastructure. Water supply consists of all means used to provide water, such as reservoirs, rivers or lakes, filtration, delivery mechanisms, water runoff, wastewater, and support to domestic and industrial applications.⁶⁸ First and foremost, water is critical to sustaining human life. However, the water supply also has an important economic value within a society that goes beyond the basic functioning of the human body. Areas lacking an established water distribution system must expend excessive labor on a continuous basis to collect and transport water for basic survival. Further, when adequate water is unavailable, these societies are faced with increased health problems. All of these issues manifest themselves in lost income due to less available labor, child truancy, and widespread disease and death. In addition, water infrastructure assists in commercial and economic stability by providing a consistent, reliable energy source, irrigation for agriculture, and inputs for commercial production processes.

Energy is another fundamental infrastructure element that improves both economic viability and the overall standard of living in local economies. Energy encompasses all power production resources from point of origin to point of consumption, including electrical power generation, transmission, distribution and storage, as well as distribution of petroleum products. Energy supply is vital for commercial growth by powering automated production processes and by providing the means for high-speed transport of goods to the marketplace. A reliable energy infrastructure enables local communities to expand their economies into neighboring districts, increasing the potential for trade and furthering economic growth.

3.4.3 Leveraging Industry: Capability, Capacity, Planning & Coordination

As previously stated, the RVI industry consists of vast array of public and private entities, ranging from governmental departments to NGOs to for-profit companies and academia. The RVI industry has sufficient technical and production capabilities to develop and maintain basic infrastructure elements within post-conflict states. Engineering and construction firms, such as Louis Berger, Kellogg Brown and Root, and Group 5 are currently working in the Middle East

and sub-Saharan Africa on infrastructure reconstruction projects. Furthermore, the industry has demonstrated the capacity to surge to meet increased demands such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. The greatest challenge the USG faces is planning and coordinating efforts across the spectrum of international organizations that comprise the reconstruction and vital infrastructure industry.

Reconstruction and economic development are of strategic and national interest to the USG. S/CRS is the lead agency in the USG to plan and coordinate efforts in a post-conflict environment. Additionally, U.S. military plays a role in post-conflict infrastructure planning and coordination in conjunction with security operations. However, the coordination of activities within the USG continues to be a challenge as S/CRS is a small organization that lacks the capacity and funding to effectively coordinate complex, multi-faceted construction or reconstruction of vital infrastructure in foreign countries.

S/CRS resides within the Department of State, the U.S. lead foreign affairs agency, but it has neither the funding nor the mandate to build roads, dams, pipelines or other vital infrastructure. Although USAID is significantly involved in providing assistance to post-conflict states, it lacks the authority to invest in large-scale physical infrastructure. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was established in 2004 with a goal to transform U.S. economic development assistance for Africa. The MCC does not have the same congressional restrictions as DoS and USAID and is able to allocate larger sums to countries that are eligible for MCC assistance. The MCC is able to accomplish this in response to the proposals of those countries, rather than priorities set in Washington increasing their effectiveness in reconstruction efforts. However, the MCC is a work-around to the existing organizational structure and is not the long-term solution towards building the USG capacity in this area.⁶⁹

3.4.4 Recommendations

- Vital infrastructure development requires a strategic vision and unity of effort. The U.S. should leverage its influence in world affairs to build a coalition of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, private industry and other nations willing and able to invest in the vital infrastructure of foreign countries to achieve the overarching reconstruction and vital infrastructure goals. To be effective, the USG must strengthen its organizational structure by aligning responsibilities and allocating resources within the interagency to prepare for and perform reconstruction activities.

3.5 Justice and Reconciliation

The post-conflict reconstruction essential task area of justice and reconciliation includes the establishment of a criminal justice system and an indigenous police force. Additionally, planners must address basic human rights and issues surrounding post-conflict relationships.

3.5.1 Justice

A strong, well-resourced, well-trained, and respected justice system is vital to the viability and legitimacy of any government. Instituting and maintaining the rule of law is essential to national recovery and prosperity. Preservation of personal safety and respect for property rights are required to attract investment, both local and foreign, needed for economic advancement. A corrupt system that gives preferential treatment to elites of the society can lead to unrest and a return to open conflict. A strong police force, fully integrated with a functioning judicial and penal system, is a bulwark against poverty and disorder. Most post-conflict situations have required the creation or substantial reform of the justice system.

The transformation of the police force typically begins early in the process. International civilian police deploy as part of the peacekeeping/peace-enforcement effort. In some cases, these same police begin to advise and mentor an existing indigenous police force, eventually leading to more formalized training. More commonly, as in the case of Kosovo and Iraq, it is necessary to start from scratch and recruit new police officers with little or no previous experience.

The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) has the USG lead in judicial development. INL learned early on that addressing the police issue by itself was inadequate, which led to complementary programs in judicial and penal system development.⁷⁰ Since 1994, the USG has devoted resources to the training and equipping of civilian police forces. It has participated directly in civil policing and in police capacity building in fourteen countries or regions.

Lacking a national police force from which to draw, the USG has used industry to contract peacekeepers and police/judicial trainers. At least four major companies have been awarded USG contracts for this type of work, and recruit candidates on their websites. The compensation is generous: DynCorp, for example, offers \$134,000 tax-free for a one-year contract, but the hours are long.⁷¹ Contractors provide candidate screening, hiring, and administrative services; in some cases, this requires opening an office in the post-conflict country.

As noted throughout this document, the State Department established S/CRS to implement the USG's post-conflict reconstruction efforts. To address the manpower issue, S/CRS has developed a three-tiered civilian response corps, consisting of active duty civilian personnel (dedicated and stand-by) and a reserve corps to be activated as needed. At least 120 of the initial 500 members of the reserve corps will be police experts.⁷² Given the large number of nation-building efforts ongoing and the long-term commitment required, it is doubtful this number will meet the demand for stabilization and peace enforcement, but it represents a shift to using direct hire personnel rather than contractors.

The question is which is more efficient, effective and less costly? Contractors provide recruiting, screening of professional skills and medical/psychological fitness, administrative support such as travel, housing, timekeeping, etc. For these efforts, contractors will recoup the salary costs and overhead, and will add their profit on top. The S/CRS will have to perform these duties for all the reserve corps personnel and create the bureaucracy to do it. Bureaucracies, once created, are hard to dismantle. A business case needs to be made that the S/CRS approach is the best value to the USG.

3.5.2 Reconciliation

Regardless of the circumstances, the RVI planner must work toward post-hostility closure which allows, if not forgiveness, a reconciling of the past in a way that allows members of the recovering nation to move forward together. A people focused on vengeance rarely move forward and are likely to lapse back into conflict. True recovery requires closure amongst those involved. However, closure means different things to different people. For some, it is the reconciling of history or clarification of facts. For others, it means justice; even if the pursuit jeopardizes full disclosure or historic accounting. This dissonance played out in post-apartheid South Africa as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission granted immunity to government offenders in exchange for a full accounting of atrocities committed. Many victims' families wrestled with the desire for vengeance in the name of justice. However, South African leaders

judged the benefit of historic clarity as more critical to national healing over the need for victim's families need for personal closure.

Leadership proved key to South African reconciliation. Expected majority backlash against the oppressive South African minority was curbed by respected leaders seeking to “bind-up” the nation's wounds. Not unlike post-Civil War America and the approach taken by Abraham Lincoln, Nelson Mandela and Bishop Desmond Tutu used their popularity and influence to quell the anger and find the better peace.

In a recent article in *Greater Good* magazine titled: "Why to Forgive", Tutu explains why forgiveness was politically necessary in allowing South Africa to begin anew. He states that “forgiveness is not turning a blind eye to wrongs; true reconciliation exposes the awfulness, the abuse, the pain, the hurt, the truth. It could even sometimes make things worse. It is a risky undertaking but in the end it is worthwhile, because in the end only an honest confrontation with reality can bring healing.”⁷³

No two post-conflict countries are alike. Unlike South Africa, external forces instigated Mozambique's post-colonial conflict. Though the factions fighting within Mozambique committed atrocities on one another, the cessation of hostilities resulted in combatants simply turning their face from the past and moving forward. In interviews, several Mozambique community leaders intimated that their people were exhausted from years of struggle and that it is not part of their temperament to dwell on the past.

The U.S., at least anecdotally, is under-resourced in the area of conflict resolution. NGOs like the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy have had and continue to enjoy great success in Liberia and Mozambique. The organization is providing significant insight into the importance of social healing and reconciliation.

3.5.3 Recommendations

- Conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether it would be cost-effective to hire police and judicial personnel through contractors or draw on existing judiciary and police to be trained as a deployable reserve corps within the USG.
- The USG should develop teams of conflict-resolution practitioners.
- Consider capitalization on expertise of NGOs.

4.0 Overarching Recommendations

A consistent thread that emerged throughout this study of the reconstruction and vital infrastructure industry is that the USG receives poor grades in the areas of deliberate planning, implementation, and the ability to work with and leverage the international community and NGOs. Improvement across each of these areas will not be possible unless constituencies from both the public and private sectors grasp the importance of the effort. The executive branch, in particular, must be willing to fully support and articulate a vision worthy of mobilizing the nation and its global partners. To this end, the USG should:

- Give reconstruction and stability operations priority commensurate with its importance to our national security strategy.

- Improve and codify external coordination procedures to make private, national and international efforts more effective.

5.0 Conclusion

The USG can improve upon its ability to leverage the strong capabilities of the diverse reconstruction and vital infrastructure “industry” – from government agencies to non-governmental organizations to multinational corporations. The USG must reform its internal organization and processes for planning and coordination, resourcing, and implementing development assistance process. This decade has seen a number of bold government initiatives to respond to the terrorism threat, including the creation of a new cabinet department, new funding authorities, and new ways of partnering with allies and other foreign actors. This creativity and urgency must carry over to the overseas development/reconstruction arena as well.

Decisive action is necessary to reorganize for unity of effort, legislate for flexible funding authorities and reduced earmarks, and establish contracting regulations and vehicles that produce results on the ground in less permissive environments. Equally important, the USG must take the initiative to partner with international institutions and build coalitions to improve donor coordination, standardize best practices, and pressure corrupt governments throughout the “bottom billion” to make the reforms required for assistance to benefit their citizens.

Assisting failing and failed states to achieve greater security, stability, and prosperity as part of the global community must be a priority objective for the USG in the coming decades. The effort will be difficult, expensive, enduring, and at times dangerous. Yet in an age of globalized commerce, population flows, and terrorism, the benefits to the target populations bring essential corresponding benefits to the United States’ security, economy, and moral leadership.

The logo for the International Center for Air Force (ICAF) is a watermark in the center of the page. It features a circular emblem with a globe in the center, surrounded by the text 'INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR AIR FORCE' and 'STRATEGIA ET DEFENSIO INSEPARABILES'. Below the emblem, the acronym 'ICAF' is written in large, bold, white letters.

Appendix A: Organizations within the RVI Industry

(Selection of U.S. and International Entities)

Essential Task	For-profit Companies
Security	<p>AEGIS; AIEE; American-Iraq Solutions Group; Armor Group; Babylon Gates; Blackwater; Blue Hackle; BritAm Defence; Centurion; Control Risks Group; DynCorp International; Edinburgh Risk; EODT; Erinys; Falcon; Garda World; Global Strategies Group; Hart; International Armored Group; Janusian; OAM; Olive Group; Page Protective Services Ltd.; Paratus Group, LLC, Passawan; Pilgrims Group Ltd.; REED; RONCO; Sabre International Security; Saladin Security Ltd.; Safenet Security; Sallyport; Securiforce; Skylink Arabia; SOC-SMG; Streit Manufacturing, Inc.; Team Fusion Ltd.; Team Savant, LLP; Threat Management Group; Triple Canopy; Unity Resources Group; Universal Security; Wamar International, Inc.</p>
Governance & Participation	<p>Almy, Gloudemans, Jacobs, and Denne; Amex International, Inc; ARD, Inc; Aristotle; Aurora Associates International; Bankworld, Inc; Bearing Point; Blue Force, LLC; Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc; BroadReach Healthcare, LLC; Carana Corporation; Carr Swanson & Randolph, LLC; Casals & Associates, Inc; Charney Research; Chemonics International, Inc; Civic Action Strategies; Computer Frontiers, Inc; Computer Sciences Corporation; Creative Associates International; Crimson Capital; Crown Agents Consultancy, Inc; DAI; De Angelis & Associates; Democracy International; Development & Training Services, Inc; Development Alternatives, Inc; Development Associates; DFI International Government Services; DPK Consulting; DynCorp International; Electronic Data Systems Corp; Emerging Markets Group, Ltd; Fire Lake Resources; Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner Research, Inc; International Business Machine; In*Sight Solutions; Integration Technologies Group, Inc; International Resource Group; International Roll Call; J.E. Austin Associates, Inc; Jacobs and Associates; Kaizen Company; Kroll Government Services; L.T. Associates, Inc; LGI Development; Lord Guernsey and Associates; Louis Berger Group, Inc; LTL Strategies; Management Systems International; Mendez England & Associates; MetaMetrics, Inc; Metropolitan Consulting Corp; Millennium/IP3; MPRI, Inc; MSI; Overseas Strategic Consulting, Ltd; Pact, Inc; PAE Consulting Group; Paige International, Inc; PBN Company; Planning and Development Collaborative International; Planning and Learning Technologies; Public International Law and Policy Group; QED Group, LLC; RTI International; Scholastics, Inc; Science Applications International Corporation; Segura Consulting, LLC; Services Group, Inc; Social Impact; Spangenberg Group; Spearman-Welch Associates; Thomas Associates; TMS Associates; Training Resources Group; Transnational Public Policy Advisors; Value Add Management Services; Vision Latina, Inc; VNG International; Voxiva; World Education, Inc; Worldwide Strategies.</p>

Essential Task	For-profit Companies
<p align="center">Humanitarian Assistance & Social Well-being</p>	<p>(DISASTER ASSISTANCE) Abt Associates; BACTEC; Bristol Myers Squibb; CAMRIS International; CDM International, Inc.; Chemonics International, Inc.; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Emerging Markets Ltd.; DynCorp; Emerging Markets Group (EMG); Futures Group International; International and Armor Group; International Resources Group; Macfadden and Associates, Incorporated; Medical Services Corporation International; RTI International.</p>
<p align="center">Economic & Infrastructure Development</p>	<p>AECOM; Black & Veatch; Contrack; Fluor; KBR; Lucent; Louis Berger; Odebrecht-Austin; Perini Corporation; Shaw Centcom Services; URS; Washington Group; Parsons Delaware; Washington International/Black and Veatch JV.</p>
<p align="center">Justice & Reconciliation</p>	<p>AMEG; CARANA Corporation; CDR Associates; Checchi and Company Consulting; Chemonics International, DPK Consulting; Conflict Management Group; Conflict Resolution; Development Training Services; Integrated Information Solutions; International Development law Organization; Ketchum; Management Sciences for Development; Management Systems International; Maximize Potential; MetaMetrics; Overseas Strategic Consulting; Pact; Planitech; Secure Source; Spangenberg Group; Walker and Company.</p>

Academic Institutions & Think Tanks

Note: The following list of academic institutions and think tanks was compiled from a number of sources, including the National Institute for Research Advancement (<http://www.nira.or.jp/past/ice/index.html>) and the University of Michigan (<http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/psthink.html>).

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; American Foreign Policy Council; Aspen Institute; Association on Third World Affairs, Inc.; Baylor University; Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy; Brookings Institution; Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Carter Center; Cascade Policy Institute; Cato Institute; Center for Defense Information; Center for Economic and Policy Research; Center for International Private Enterprise; Center for National Policy; Center for Public Policy and Contemporary Issues-Institute for Public Policy Studies, University of Denver; Center for Strategic and International Studies; Center of International Studies, Princeton University; Committee for Economic Development; Commonwealth Institute; Consensus Council, Inc.; Council on Foreign Relations; Discovery Institute; Earth Policy Institute; Economic Growth Center; Economic Policy Institute; Economic Strategy Institute; Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Ethics and Public Policy Center; Foreign Policy Research Institute; Heritage Foundation; Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; Institute for the Future; Institute for International Economics; Institute for Research on Poverty; International Food Policy Research Institute; International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development; Johns Hopkins University Center for Civil Society Studies; Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies; Milken Institute; National Bureau of Economic Research; National Center for Policy Analysis; National Health Policy Forum; Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development; Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of

Academic Institutions & Think Tanks

Government; Nixon Center; Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies; Population Council; RAND Corporation (RAND); Regional Research Institute; Resources for the Future; Rockford Institute; Social Science Research Council; Southern Center for International Studies; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College; United States Institute of Peace; Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy; Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; World Peace Foundation; World Policy Institute; World Resources Institute; Worldwatch Institute.

Non-governmental Organizations

Note: The following list of NGOs is limited to only U.S.-based organizations with an emphasis in “sustainable development” and RVI-related issues. A comprehensive, searchable database of more than 3500 NGOs recognized by the United Nations can be found at: <http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/>.

Adventist Development and Relief Agency; African Action on AIDS; African Development Institute, Inc.; Africare; Agricultural Missions, Inc.; Alan Guttmacher Institute; American Association of Engineering Societies; American Association of Jurists; American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists; American Forest and Paper Association; American Indian Law Alliance; American Psychological Association; American Society of International Law; Anglican Consultative Council; Armenian Assembly of America; Association of the Bar of the City of New York; Association of United Families International; Association of World Citizens; Center for Alcohol and Drug Research and Education; Center for Cognitive Liberty and Ethics; Center for International Earth Science Information Network; Center for International Environmental Law; Center for International Health and Cooperation; Center for International Rehabilitation; Centre for International Cooperation; Citizens Network for Sustainable Development; Climate Institute; Concerned Women for America; Cooperative Housing Foundation; Council on International and Public Affairs; David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies; Earthcorps; Earthjustice; Environmental Defense Fund; European Institute; Family Health International; Foresight Institute; Global Housing Foundation; Global Resource Action Center for the Environment; Global Volunteers; Globe International; Heritage Foundation; Hope for Africa; HOPE Worldwide; Humane Society of the United States; Hunger Project; Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy; Institute for Multicultural Communications Cooperation and Development, Inc.; Institute for Transportation and Development Policy; Interaction, American Council for Voluntary International Action; International Association Against Torture; International Association for Housing Science; International Association for Impact Assessment; International Association for Research in Income and Wealth; International Association of Lions Clubs; International Center for Research on Women; International Multiracial Shared Cultural Organization; International Public Policy Institute; International Research Foundation for Development; International Studies Association; International Youth Foundation; Labor/Community Strategy Center; League of Women Voters of the United States; Mercy-USA for Aid and Development, Inc; Millenium Institute; Mother And Child African Relief Organization; National Bar Association; NGO Health Committee, Inc.; Open Society Institute; Parliamentarians for Global Action; Partnership for Indigenous Peoples Environment; Peaceways - Young General Assembly; People Centered Development Forum; Plan International, Inc.; Population Action International; Population Institute; Population Reference Bureau; Project Concern International, Inc.; Reach the Children, Inc.; Resources for the Future, Inc.; Rotary International; Saratoga Foundation for Women Worldwide, Inc.; Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues; Sociologists for Women in Society; South-North Development Initiative; Tinker Institute on International Law and Organizations;

Non-governmental Organizations

Together Foundation for Global Unity; UNANIMA International; United Nations Association of the USA; United Way International; Water Environment Federation; Women's Learning Partnership for Rights, Development, and Peace; World Conference of Religion for Peace; World Council of Credit Unions, Inc.; World Federation for Mental Health; World Safety Organization; World Trade Centers Association; World Vision International; Worldwatch Institute; Worldwide Organization for Women.



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The logo for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICAF) is centered on the page. It features a circular emblem with a central figure holding a sword and a shield, surrounded by the Latin motto 'INDUSTRIAM ET DEFENSIONEM INSEPARABILEM'. Below the emblem, the letters 'ICAF' are written in a large, bold, sans-serif font.

End Notes

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stabilization and reconstruction curriculum for use in programs of the Foreign Service Institute, the National Defense University, and the United States Army War College.”

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- ³⁸ Ibid, 64.
- ³⁹ James Dobbins, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building*, 15.
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